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VICTOR'S NOT SO LITTLE SECRET: TRADEMARK DILUTION IS
DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE FOLLOWING
MOSELEY V. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC
JESSICA C. KAISER*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue,
Inc. recently interpreted when use of a mark "causes dilution" within the
meaning of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.1 This decision made it
significantly harder in some circuits for plaintiffs to prove trademark dilu-
tion (and spawned more questions than it answered); nonetheless, federal
trademark dilution remains a viable cause of action post-Moseley.
Trademarks are the words and symbols that companies use to distin-
guish their products. 2 Consumers rely on the trademarks as symbols of the
product, source, and quality of the goods. 3 To obtain an exclusive right in a
mark, a trademark owner must use the mark in commerce. Because trade-
mark rights arise only through use, they are not rights in gross. In contrast,
other forms of intellectual property do confer rights in gross. A patent
holder, for example, can exclude others from making, using, or selling an
invention, even though the patent holder merely obtained, but never com-
mercially exploited, his patent registration. The rationale behind this dis-
tinction is that trademark rights exist only to protect the goodwill of the
mark and prevent deception of consumers4 while patent rights create an
incentive to innovate. Trademark rights exist as long as the owner uses the
mark in commerce; therefore, they can be unlimited in duration.5 Tradi-
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2005; B.S., Metallurgical and Materials Engi-
neering, Colorado School of Mines, 1996. The author would like to thank Professor Graeme Dinwoodie
and Chris Kaiser for their valuable comments and insights.
1. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
2. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basisfor Trade-
mark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 790 (1997).
3. Id,
4. Id. at 792.
5. Id. at 792-93.
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tionally, any junior user6 could adopt a similar or even identical mark, so
long as consumers were not confused as to the source of the good.7
Trademark dilution departs significantly from this model because
dilution is designed to protect the mark itself instead of consumers. In a
famous 1927 article, Professor Frank Schechter defined trademark dilution
as "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing
goods." 8 This view was radical in its time, and many still consider it so
today, because such a definition effectively creates trademark rights in
gross. A less controversial definition of trademark dilution is "the dimin-
ishment over time of the capacity of a distinctive trademark to identify the
source of goods bearing that mark."9 In either case, the harm caused by
dilution is not to consumers but instead to the trademark itself-"to its
uniqueness, to its singularity, and to its capacity to identify the source of
goods sold under it."' 0
Courts have recognized two types of dilution: blurring and tarnish-
ment. Blurring occurs when customers see the famous mark on many dif-
ferent goods and services, although these goods and services are not sold
by the famous mark holder. 1' These junior uses may weaken "[t]he unique
and distinctive significance of the mark to identify and distinguish one
source" although the junior use does not cause confusion as to the source of
the goods or services. 12 For example, a newly opened Tiffany restaurant
may not cause confusion with the famous Tiffany jewelers. Nevertheless,
the restaurant may cause dilution by blurring because consumers no longer
associate Tiffany solely with the jewelry store. 13 Tarnishment generally
occurs when the junior user uses the mark for goods of low quality or for
6. A junior user, as used in this Note, is someone who uses an identical or similar mark to a mark
that already exists in the marketplace. First, the senior user (or the famous mark holder, once the mark
has achieved the requisite level of fame) enters the marketplace and uses a mark to identify his goods. A
junior user then enters the marketplace and uses an identical or similar mark to identify his goods.
7. Id. at 793. Trademark infringement occurs as a result of likelihood of confusion, such that "a
reasonably prudent buyer" would think that "some connection or sponsorship existed" between the uses
of the mark. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:70 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCCARTHY]. A plaintiff can recover for dilution, even in the ab-
sence of a likelihood of confusion. Id.
8. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927).
9. Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Con-
fusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP, MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121, 123 (1996).
10. Id.
11. MCCARTIY, supra note 7, § 24:68.
12. ld.
13. Id.
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morally questionable goods, such that consumers' perception of the famous
mark is changed. 14
Before 1996, trademark dilution was only proscribed by state statutes,
and even then in only approximately half of the states. 15 In 1947, Massa-
chusetts adopted the first state dilution statute, and by 1996, twenty-eight
states had followed suit.1 6 These state statutes typically allowed a cause of
action for dilution as long as the plaintiff could show, inter alia, that the
defendant's mark was likely to dilute the plaintiff's mark. 17 A trademark
owner did not have a cause of action in federal court until the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA").l8 The FTDA provides a rem-
edy for famous mark holders if a junior use "begins after the mark has be-
come famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the [famous]
mark." 19
In Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court had occasion to resolve a circuit split and interpret the term "causes
dilution" in the FTDA. Before Moseley, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits re-
quired a showing of actual economic harm while the Second, Seventh, and
Sixth Circuits required only a showing of likelihood of dilution. Moseley
radically changed how owners of famous trademarks could protect their
marks from dilution by junior users because holders of famous marks must
now show that the junior use caused actual dilution.
This Note will discuss how famous mark holders can successfully
pursue trademark dilution claims, albeit with difficulty, after the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Moseley. Section I provides an overview of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Section II reviews the cases that
led to the circuit split over what Congress meant by "causes dilution." Sec-
tion III explores the lower court and Supreme Court opinions in the Mose-
14. Id. § 24:69 ("[T]he effect of the defendant's unauthorized use is to tarnish, degrade, or dilute
the distinctive quality of the mark."); Prager, supra note 9, at 124. One court has indicated that dilution
through tarnishment is not proven just by showing that a junior use is a "cheap knock-off' if the junior
user "is not attempting to associate [the famous mark owner's] products with obscenity or sexual or
illegal activity, [and] the [junior user's] product line is neither shoddy or unwholesome." Clinique
Laboratories, Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
15. Prager, supra note 9, at 123.
16. Klieger, supra note 2, at 811.
17. fd- at 813. Thirty states had enacted antidilution statutes by 2002. MCCARTHY, supra note 7,
§ 24:80 n.2. These state statutes are modeled on the 1964 or 1992 version of the United States (now
International) Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill, and the model bill uses a likelihood
of dilution standard. Id. § 24:80.
18. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000)). A previous version of the FTDA was contained in the 1988 Trade-
mark Law Revision Act, but Congress removed the antidilution provisions from the bill before it passed
Congress. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:86.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
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ley case. Section IV argues that famous mark holders can still prove trade-
mark dilution post-Moseley, but that proving a federal cause of action will
now be more difficult in some circuits because plaintiffs have to show ac-
tual dilution. Section IV then argues that in order to successfully pursue
trademark dilution claims plaintiffs should: (1) argue that identity of the
famous mark and the junior user's mark provides evidence of actual dilu-
tion; (2) carefully craft consumer surveys that provide evidence of actual
dilution; (3) forum shop to bring separate state law claims in states that
only require a likelihood of dilution; and (4) argue that evidence that shows
actual dilution is just beginning to occur should be sufficient to prove ac-
tual dilution.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995
The FTDA allows the owner of a famous trademark to obtain injunc-
tive relief against a junior user if the junior use is commercial, if the junior
use began after the senior mark became famous, and if the junior use
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous mark.20 The Act
defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of: (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other par-
ties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 21 The Act also
provides numerous factors for use in determining whether a mark is distinc-
tive and famous. 22 The Act limits recovery for dilution to injunctive relief
unless the junior user "willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation
or to cause dilution of the famous mark."' 23 The Act also provides defenses
for fair use and noncommercial use, as well as an exemption for news re-
porting and news commentary. 24
20. Id.
21. Id. § 1127.
22. The factors are:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent
of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C)
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent
of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or ser-
vices with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading ar-
eas and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id. § 1125(c)(1). This Note does not discuss these factors in detail because the Victoria's Secret mark at
issue in Moseley was clearly famous under these factors.
23. Id. § 1125(c)(2).
24. Id. § 1125(c)(4).
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Congress passed the FTDA for two main purposes. First, Congress
wanted to promote national uniformity in the trademark law because fa-
mous marks are used on a national basis. 25 Congress also worried that lack
of uniformity would lead to forum-shopping.26 Second, Congress passed
the FTDA to comply with international obligations contained in the TRIPS
agreement and the Paris convention, 27 and to assist the executive branch in
its efforts to gain more protection for U.S. famous marks in foreign
countries. 28
The rationale underlying the FTDA differs from the traditional ration-
ale underlying trademark infringement because trademark infringement
causes of action are designed to prevent consumer confusion. "Confusion
leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed
to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark." 29
Therefore, the harm sought to be prevented by dilution under the Act is
really harm to the "strong identification value of the plaintiff's mark" itself
as opposed to harm to consumers caused by confusion.30
II. THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A circuit split arose over the correct interpretation of the phrase
"causes dilution" in the FTDA. 3 1 The Fourth and the Fifth Circuits held
that trademark dilution under the FTDA required a showing of actual harm.
These Circuits reasoned that the FTDA does not expressly state "likelihood
of dilution," whereas state dilution statutes do contain such language, and
because the primary aim of dilution is to protect the economic value of the
mark itself. However, the Second, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits required
only a likelihood of dilution. Because the available remedy under the
25. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. Before the
FTDA, only about half of the states had laws prohibiting trademark dilution. Id.
26. Id- at 4.
27. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPS Agree-
ment provides that:
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or ser-
vices which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided
that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that
the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 16, para. 3, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1204.
28. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4.
29. Id- at 3 (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
30. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:70.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
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FTDA is injunctive relief (unless the dilution is willful), these Circuits
worried that a more stringent standard would cause the famous mark holder
to suffer uncompensable injury. At the same time, the courts worried that
the junior user would expend resources on a mark, only to have the use of
the mark later enjoined when dilution occurred.
A. Actual Harm Standard
The keystone case for the actual harm standard is Ringling Brothers-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Devel-
opment.32 Ringling, owner of the "Greatest Show on Earth" mark, sued the
Utah Division of Travel Development, alleging that Utah's use of the mark
"Greatest Snow on Earth" diluted "Greatest Show on Earth" under the
FTDA. 33 The district court found that Ringling had not proven dilution, and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.34
Ringling argued that mental association of the two marks by consum-
ers was sufficient to prove dilution,35 but the court rejected Ringling's ar-
gument that mental association alone was sufficient to establish dilution.36
Instead, the court adopted a standard that required actual economic harm
and rejected the less stringent "likelihood of dilution" standard. 37 The court
found that the main purpose of antidilution statutes is to prevent harm to
the economic value of famous marks.38 Additionally, the FTDA made no
mention of likelihood of dilution, while such language was contained ex-
pressly in many state statutes. 39 The FTDA defines dilution as "the lessen-
ing of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services," 40 and the court reasoned that the FTDA was ultimately aimed at
protecting the mark's selling power and not its distinctiveness alone.4 1
Therefore, the court found that dilution requires proof that:
32. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
33. Id. at 451.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 457 (finding that this standard assumes that harm to a mark's selling power cannot be
proven by direct evidence and must instead be presumed from the similarity of the junior and senior
marks).
38. Id. at 456.
39. Id. at 458. The court also noted that about half the states had enacted state statutes to prohibit
trademark dilution and that one of the typical features of such statutes was that they proscribed likeli-
hood of dilution. Id. at 454.
40. Id. at 458.
41. Id.
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(1) a defendant has made use of a junior mark sufficiently similar to the
famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental as-
sociation of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to the
famous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling power as
an advertising agent for its goods and services. 42
B. Likelihood of Dilution Standard
Conversely, the Second, Seventh, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals
adopted a less stringent standard that requires the famous mark holder to
prove only a likelihood of dilution. The leading case for this interpretation
is Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Jnc.43 PF Brands ("Pepperidge Farm"),
owner of the "Goldfish" cracker trademark, sued Nabisco for trademark
dilution because Nabisco manufactured "CatDog" cheese crackers, which
included goldfish-shaped crackers.44 The court stated that dilution under
the FTDA requires five elements: "(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2)
it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial use in com-
merce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark has become famous; and (5)
it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark. '45 To
help courts determine when a senior mark has suffered dilution, the court
announced a nonexclusive list of factors that courts should consider in de-
termining dilution: (a) distinctiveness; (b) similarity of marks; (c) prox-
imity of products and likelihood of bridging the gap; (d) interrelationship
among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior
mark, and the proximity of the products; (e) shared consumers and geo-
graphic limitations; (f) sophistication of consumers; (g) actual confusion;
(h) adjectival or referential quality of the junior use; (i) harm to the junior
user and delay by the senior user; and (j) effect of senior user's laxity in
protecting the mark.46
The Second Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's requirement that the
famous mark holder prove actual, consummated harm.47 The court found
that the Fourth Circuit standard relied on "excessive literalism" and that,
contrary to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, Congress likely intended that
a famous mark holder could obtain an injunction to prevent the harm before
42. Id. at 461. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., adopted the Fourth Circuit "actual harm" standard for proving trademark dilution because the plain
meaning of the statute shows that Congress did not intend a likelihood of dilution standard. 214 F.3d
658,671 (5th Cir. 2000).
43. 191 F.3d208(2dCir. 1999).
44. Id. at 213.
45. Id. at 215.
46. Id. at 217-22.
47. Id. at 223.
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it occurs. 4 8 The Second Circuit also worried that an actual harm require-
ment would hurt junior users because a court could not enjoin the use under
the FTDA until the junior user had expended resources on the new mark
and caused actual economic harm.49 Therefore, the court adopted a likeli-
hood of dilution standard. 50
The Seventh Circuit, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., fol-
lowed the Second Circuit and adopted the likelihood of dilution standard. 51
The Seventh Circuit adopted this standard because the FTDA only provides
for injunctive relief (absent willfulness), and under an actual economic
harm standard, famous mark holders would suffer uncompensable injury. 52
The Seventh Circuit also worried that trademark dilution would be impos-
sible to prove under an actual economic harm standard. 53 Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit did not adopt all of the Second Circuit factors because it
found that some of the factors were irrelevant to a dilution analysis. 54 In-
stead, the Seventh Circuit applied only two factors, the similarity between
the junior and senior marks and the renown of the senior mark.55
Therefore, when the Supreme Court reviewed the Moseley case, it was
faced with an entrenched circuit split based on two competing theories of
statutory interpretation.
III. THE SUPREME COURT MOSELEY DECISION
A. Moseley Background and Lower Court Decisions
V. Secret Catalogue and affiliated companies, owner of the "Victoria's
Secret" mark, sued Moseley for, inter alia, trademark dilution under the
FTDA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Ken-
48. Id. at 224 ("To read the statute as suggested by the Ringling opinion would subject the senior
user to uncompensable injury ... because the statute provides only for an injunction and no dam-
ages .... ).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 224-25 ("[W]e read the statute to permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction,
whether at the instance of the senior user or the junior seeking declaratory relief, before the dilution has
actually occurred.").
51. 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000).
52. Id. at 467.
53. Id. at 468 ("It is hard to believe that Congress would create a right of action but at the same
time render proof of the plaintifi's case all but impossible.").
54. Id. at 468-69.
55. Id. at 469. The Sixth Circuit also adopted the likelihood of dilution standard in V. Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464,475-76 (6th Cir. 2001), discussed infra, Section IIlA.
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tucky.56 Victoria's Secret is a famous retailer of women's lingerie, operates
over 750 stores, and distributes 400 million copies of its catalogue each
year.57 The Moseleys opened a store called "Victor's Secret" in Elizabeth-
town, KY, which sold men's and women's lingerie and other adult items. 58
The Moseleys claimed that they were unaware of Victoria's Secret until
they received a cease and desist letter from Victoria's Secret's counsel. 59
After receiving this letter, the Moseleys changed the name of the store to
"Victor's Little Secret." 60
The district court stated that, under the FTDA, the plaintiff must show:
"(1) its mark is famous, (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of its
mark in commerce, (3) the defendant's use of its mark came after the plain-
tiffs mark became famous, and (4) the defendant's use of its mark dilutes
the quality of the plaintiffs mark. '61 The first three elements were not
disputed.62 Therefore, the only issue before the district court was whether
the Moseleys' use of "Victor's Little Secret" diluted the Victoria's Secret
mark.63 The district court found that the Moseleys diluted the Victoria's
Secret mark through blurring (because Victor's Little Secret was suffi-
ciently similar to Victoria's Secret) and through tarnishment (because the
Moseleys sold adult videos, sex toys, and adult novelties in their store). 64
Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment to Victoria's Secret
and enjoined the Moseleys from using the mark "Victor's Little Secret."65
The Moseleys appealed the district court decision to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 66 and the Sixth Circuit considered whether to adopt the
Nabisco likelihood of dilution standard or the Ringling actual harm stan-
dard.67 After reviewing the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ringling and the
Second Circuit's opinion in Nabisco, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit's likelihood of dilution standard.68 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
56. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9,
2000).
57. Id. at * 1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at "5.
62. Id.
63. id.
64. Id. at *5-.
65. Id. at *6.
66. After the issuance of the injunction by the district court, the Moscleys changed the name of
their store to "Cathy's Little Secret" without objection from Victoria's Secret. V. Secret Catalogue v.
Moseley, 259 F-3d 464,467-68 (6th Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 472.
68. Id. at 475.
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the injury that Congress was trying to prevent by enacting the FTDA was to
the mark's distinctiveness. 69 The Sixth Circuit also stated that the legisla-
tive history indicated that Congress intended "to allow a remedy before
dilution has actually caused economic harm to the senior mark."'70 The
Sixth Circuit also worried about the difficulty of proving actual harm.
7 1
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit applied the list of nonexclusive factors from
Nabisco and found that a likelihood of dilution existed both by blurring and
tarnishment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. 72
B. The Moseley Supreme Court Decision
The Moseleys appealed the decision of the Sixth Circuit to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
circuit split and announce the standard for proving trademark dilution un-
der the FTDA. 73 The Court rejected the "likelihood of dilution" standard
and interpreted the statute to require a showing of actual dilution. 74 How-
ever, the Court declined to wholly adopt the Fourth Circuit standard, which
required actual economic harm.75 The Court also found that consumers'
mental association of the junior user's mark with the famous mark is not
sufficient to establish actual dilution, "at least where the marks at issue are
not identical."'76
Applying the actual dilution standard to the facts of the Moseley case,
the Court found that Victoria's Secret had failed to prove dilution by either
blurring or tamishment to sufficiently support summary judgment. 77 The
record showed that an army officer made a mental association between
69. Id. at 475-76.
70. Id. at 476 ("'[C]onfusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if
allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.') (emphasis in original)
(quoting H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030).
71. Id. ("[Rlequiring proof of actual economic harm will make bringing a successful claim under
the FTDA unreasonably difficult.").
72. Id. at 476-77.
73. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003). Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion, which was unanimous as to the result. Id. at 419-20. Justice Scalia joined in all but
Part Ill of the opinion, which detailed the legislative history, but Justice Sealia did not write separately.
Id. at 420. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id.
74. Id. at 433. The Supreme Court, like the Fourth Circuit, placed weight on the fact that many
state statutes and other provisions in the Lanham Act referred to a likelihood of dilution, whereas the
FTDA uses the language "causes dilution." Id. at 432-33. The Court also looked at the definition of
dilution and made a contrast between an actual "lessening of capacity of the mark" and a later reference
to "likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id. at 433.
75. Id. (holding that consequences of dilution such as actual lost sales or profits need not be
proved).
76. Id.
77 Id. at 434.
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Victor's Little Secret and Victoria's Secret but also that the officer did not
change his impression of Victoria's Secret because of the mental associa-
tion.78 Further, Victoria's Secret did not present any evidence showing that
Victor's Little Secret lessened the capacity of Victoria's Secret to identify
and distinguish goods or services.79 The Court noted that respondents and
their amici had argued that evidence of actual lessening of capacity of the
mark would be difficult to prove, but the Court found that difficulty of
proof was an insufficient reason to dispense with "an essential element of a
statutory violation." 80 Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded. 81
Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy
stated that more attention should be given to the word "capacity" as it was
used to define dilution. 82 Justice Kennedy found, using dictionary defini-
tions of "capacity," that dilution should be interpreted more broadly than
the majority's interpretation because, in some cases, "the fact that this
power [of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods] will be di-
minished could suffice to show dilution." 83 Further, Justice Kennedy, like
the Second Circuit, found that injunctive relief as the exclusive remedy
indicated that Congress intended for the famous mark holder to obtain re-
lief before "the damage is done and the distinctiveness of the mark has
been eroded. " 84 With these additional observations, Justice Kennedy joined
the opinion of the Court.85
IV. OPTIONS FOR FAMOUS MARK HOLDERS TO SUCCESSFULLY CLAIM
TRADEMARK DILUTION POST-MOSELEY
The Moseley decision made trademark dilution under the FTDA more
difficult to prove in those circuits that had previously adopted a likelihood
of dilution standard.86 Conversely, the Moseley decision made dilution
under the FTDA somewhat easier to prove by rejecting the requirement of
actual economic harm. This section will discuss ways that famous mark
owners can protect their marks by bringing dilution claims. First, dictum in
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The FTDA defines dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
83. Moseley, 537 U.S at 435 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
84. Id. at 436.
85. Id.
86. Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 804 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The Supreme Court in
essence made it more difficult for dilution claims to succeed because plaintiffs face a much higher
hurdle of demonstrating actual dilution .... ).
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the Moseley decision seemed to create two classes of cases, those where the
famous mark and the junior user's mark are identical and those where they
are not. However, this dictum has already spawned split over what the Su-
preme Court meant by this dictum. Despite this split, famous mark holders
should argue, if the famous mark and the junior user's mark are identical,
that identity provides evidence of actual dilution. Second, famous mark
holders should craft consumer surveys designed to show that the junior use
has caused actual dilution. Third, famous mark holders should pursue state
law dilution claims whenever possible because state laws typically only
require a showing of likelihood of dilution. Finally, famous mark holders
should argue that courts should require a low threshold showing of actual
dilution under Moseley because the FTDA only provides injunctive relief
unless the dilution is willful.
A. Dilution and Identical Marks: A Chink in Moseley's Armor?
Dictum in the Moseley decision suggests that the bar is lower for prov-
ing actual dilution when the famous mark and the junior user's mark are
identical. Courts have already disagreed over the interpretation of this dic-
tum. However, when pursuing a dilution claim, famous mark holders
should argue that identity provides evidence of actual dilution.
In Moseley, the Supreme Court suggested that it would have reached a
different result if the marks had been identical. First, the Court referenced
the legislative history, which specifically stated that the use of DUPONT
shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos, marks identical to famous
marks, would be actionable under the FTDA.87 Further, the Court qualified
its holding that mental association was insufficient to establish dilution by
stating, "at least where the marks at issue are not identical."' 88 Further, the
Court stated that "direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will
not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circum-
stantial evidence-the obvious case is one where the junior and senior
marks are identical." 89 These statements show that the Court did not intend
a broad interpretation of Moseley to apply to cases where the famous and
junior marks are identical.
The Court properly created a distinction between identical marks and
nonidentical marks because, when the marks are identical, actual dilution
can more easily be inferred. A court can draw this inference when the
87. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; 141 CONG. REC. 38559-38561(1995)).
88. Id. at 433.
89. Id. at 434.
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marks are identical because "consumers will view the two marks as the
same mark and associate a new product with that mark."90 However, courts
have already struggled with applying the Supreme Court's dictum about
identical marks.
Some district courts have followed the approach that the identity of
marks provides the required circumstantial evidence of actual dilution.9 1
Further, a prominent commentator has suggested that no circumstantial
evidence beyond identity should be required when the famous mark is a
"coined, fanciful mark."'92
Recently, Courts of Appeal have been following suit. In Savin Corp. v.
The Savin Group, the district court had refashioned the Moseley dictum as
"[a]ctual dilution may be shown through circumstantial evidence, particu-
larly when the marks in question are identical." 93 In deciding that more
than identity is required, the court relied on the sentence following the Su-
preme Court's dictum regarding circumstantial evidence: "Whatever diffi-
culties of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for
dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation." 94
The court interpreted this to mean that additional evidence of actual dilu-
tion beyond identity was required because otherwise the court would be
allowing the famous mark holder to dispense with the required element of
proof merely by showing the marks are identical.95
90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Part at 20, Moseley v.
V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter U.S.
Amicus Brief].
91. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1085 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (holding that, since defendant had used Honda's trade dress and trademarks on remote control
cars, dilution could be inferred from the identical nature of the marks); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autova-
tion Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763-64 (E.D, Mich. 2004) (holding that "GM's evidence estab-
lishes actual dilution in that Defendant has used marks that are identical to the world-famous GM
Trademarks" and that consumer surveys were not necessary under the Supreme Court's Moseley deci-
sion); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. McEvoy, 300 F. Supp. 2d 352, 357 (D. Md. 2004) (finding that no additional
circumstantial evidence of actual dilution is required where the defendant uses the plaintiff's mark);
Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (applying the actual
dilution requirement of Moseley and holding that dilution had occurred because the marks were identi-
cal or virtually identical); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (holding
that defendant's registration of the domain names, "Pinehurstresort.eom" and "Pinehurstresorts.com,"
had diluted the plaintiff's mark, "Pinehurst Resort and Country Club," because the domain names were
identical or virtually identical to the plaintiffs mark).
92. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:94.2 (No additional evidence should be required if the famous
mark is a "coined, fanciful mark" such as Exxon, but if the mark is not a "coined, fanciful mark" such
as Saturn then some additional evidence should be required.).
93. No. 02 Civ.9377 SAS, 2003 WL 22451731, at *13 (SD.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003).
94. Id. at * 14-15 (quoting Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003)).
95. Id. Since the plaintiff had provided no additional evidence of actual dilution, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id.
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district
court's interpretation: "We interpret Moseley to mean that where a plaintiff
who owns a famous senior mark can show the commercial use of an identi-
cal junior mark, such a showing constitutes circumstantial evidence of the
actual-dilution element of an FTDA claim." 96 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, created a strict identity rule, where the marks must be identical and
not just similar. 97 The court also stated that the marks must be identical in
context, looking not just at the words but also at the "font, size, color,
etc." 98 The Eighth Circuit has also indicated that it will follow this
approach. 99
Other courts, however, have reasoned that the Moseley dictum re-
quires the famous mark holder to provide additional circumstantial evi-
dence beyond the marks being identical. In Ty Inc. v. Sofibelly's, Inc.,
Judge Posner stated that "[t]he Court did not explain and no one seems to
know what that 'circumstantial evidence' might be."' 00 While Judge Posner
did not directly address this issue because the marks in Ty were not identi-
cal, 101 he indicated that, if faced with this issue, he would require evidence
beyond identity of marks to find that actual dilution had occurred. 102 A few
district courts have also indicated that they would require a showing be-
yond identity to prove actual dilution. 03
Despite this split, famous mark holders should argue that courts
should resolve this confusion by limiting the Moseley requirements to cases
where the marks are not identical. Courts should find dilution without an
explicit showing of actual dilution where the famous mark and the junior
96. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 453 ("In other words, a mere similarity in the marks---even a close similarity-will not
suffice to establish per se evidence of actual dilution.").
98. Id. Since the district court had not made a clear finding as to the marks' identity, the Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the marks were identical. Id. at 454.
99. Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 2005). The
Eighth Circuit wrote:
On appeal, Everest Capital argues that it proved actual dilution as a matter of law because
"the names and marks at issue are identical for purposes of trademark law." Based upon our
visual examination of the marks, this contention is frivolous. See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group,
391 F.3d 439, 453 (2d Cir, 2004) ("a mere similarity in the marks--even a close similarity-
will not suffice to establish per se evidence of actual dilution").
Id.
100. 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003).
101. Id. ("Neither 'Beanies' nor 'Beanie Babies' is identical to 'Screenie Beanies."').
102. Id.
103. See Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (citing cases where courts found that additional evidence beyond identity was neces-
sary but denying summary judgment and allowing plaintiff to present its dilution claim to the jury);
Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (declining to decide
the issue but recognizing that identity along with evidence of mental association was sufficient).
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user's mark are identical or virtually identical because this approach is
consistent with the Supreme Court's language in Moseley and because this
approach supports the policies behind the FTDA. This approach will ensure
that trademark dilution remains a viable way for famous mark holders to
protect the value of their marks from identical or nearly identical variants
of the famous marks. This approach will also give effect to Justice Ken-
nedy's concurrence; he stated that showing that the junior use will diminish
the power of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services
should, in some cases, be sufficient to establish dilution. Further, this ap-
proach will allow, at least in cases of identical or nearly identical junior
uses, the injunctive relief authorized by the statute to be an effective rem-
edy to famous mark holders, ensuring that they will not suffer damage to
their mark that can never be compensated.
However, even when "identity equals dilution," the famous mark
holder must still show that consumers make a mental association between
the junior use and the famous mark. Without this mental association, an
inference of actual dilution based solely on identity could not be drawn.
Consider Town X, a tiny rural community. In Town X, people have no
access to media, and people only leave Town X to visit relatives in
neighboring rural communities. Town X is off the beaten path, and so no
tourists have been to visit Town X. Victoria, a resident of Town X, opens a
small shop at her home to sell cloth, and she calls her shop Victoria's Se-
cret, which she thinks is clever. An executive of the famous Victoria's Se-
cret drives along a small country road, and his car breaks down near Town
X. The executive walks to the nearest farm for help, and he learns about the
local Victoria's Secret. The company sues to enjoin the use of the name
under the FTDA.
In this hypothetical, no inference of actual dilution could be drawn
from the identical nature of the names. The junior use of Victoria's Secret
creates no actual dilution because the residents of Town X never knew the
famous Victoria's Secret, and because people outside of Town X have
never heard of the junior Victoria's Secret. However, the "identity equals
dilution" argument again makes sense if Victoria opens stores in towns
where consumers are aware of Victoria's Secret.
Therefore, any argument that identical marks provide evidence of
actual dilution must be bolstered with evidence that consumers are aware of
both the famous mark and the junior use and evidence that consumers make
a mental association between the two.
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B. Uncertainty of Prooffor Nonidentical Marks After Moseley: The Con-
sumer Survey Lives On
For nonidentical marks, the most effective means of proving actual
dilution post-Moseley will be a well-crafted consumer survey, although
Moseley did not make entirely clear what such a survey must show. Actual
dilution after Moseley may be difficult to prove, even with a consumer
survey, because dilution often occurs in many small steps instead of all at
once. This uncertainty has arisen because the Supreme Court in Moseley
did not clearly define what a famous mark holder must show to establish
actual dilution; instead, the Supreme Court only established outer bounds.
Famous mark holders now know that mere mental association between
their famous mark and the junior user's mark is insufficient to establish
trademark dilution. 104 However, famous mark holders are not required to
suffer actual loss of sales or profits to show that actual dilution has
occurred. 105
Between these outer bounds, the Supreme Court did not specifically
state what famous mark holders must show to prove actual dilution, and
therefore, famous mark holders may have some difficulty crafting effective
consumer surveys. However, the Court seemed to indicate that consumer
surveys would be sufficient to prove actual dilution if they show that a
junior use has created not only a mental association in consumers but also a
tendency for consumers to identify the famous mark less strongly with the
famous mark holder (for blurring) or a change in perception towards the
famous mark holder (for tarnishment).106
104. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) ("[A]t least where the marks
at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a
famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution."). In Starbucks Corp. v. Lundberg, No.
CV 02-948-HA, 2004 WL 1784753, at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2004), the court applied the Supreme
Court's Moseley decision and held that consumers' mental association between Starbucks and Sam-
buck's was insufficient to support a claim for federal trademark dilution.
105. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 ("[A]ctual dilution must be established. Of course, that does not
mean that the consequences of dilution, such as actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved.").
106. Id. at 433-34 The Court discussed the facts of Ringling and stated that:
even though Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license plate refer-
ring to the "greatest snow on earth," it by no means follows that they will associate "the great-
est show on earth" with skiing or snow sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with
the circus.
Id. The Supreme Court did not specifically address tamishment, and some commentators have sug-
gested that dilution by tanishment did not survive Moseley. See, e.g., Jonathan Moskin, Victoria's Big
Secret: Whither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 842, 855 (2003).
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1. Consumer surveys can assist in a showing of actual dilution.
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically state what a famous
mark holder must show to prove actual dilution, consumer surveys remain
a viable method of proving dilution post-Moseley under the FTDA. 107
To prove actual dilution, famous mark holders must consider two
critical components in crafting consumer surveys: the universe of the sur-
vey and the methodology of the survey.' 08 The universe of the survey is the
population being asked the survey questions, and usually consists of the
famous mark holder's customers, the junior user's customers, or both.109
The methodology refers to the type of questions and controls used in the
survey." 0 Both components must be carefully considered when developing
a survey so that the results will carry weight in proving that actual dilution
occurred. "'1
Since famous mark holders often pursue both trademark infringement
and dilution claims, famous mark holders should be aware that the survey
methodology to prove these claims likely will differ. 112 In crafting a con-
sumer survey, famous mark holders must remember that the standards for
dilution and infringement are different and that consumer surveys will need
to include questions directed toward consumer confusion to prove in-
fringement and questions directed toward actual dilution to prove dilution.
The Ninth Circuit recently recognized that a famous mark holder had
shown likelihood of dilution by blurring by introducing evidence "suggest-
ing that a significant number of Internet users assume that advertisements
are sponsored or somehow affiliated with [the famous mark holder] after a
search using [the famous marks]."113 This evidence consisted of a survey
where participants were shown internet search results for the famous
marks, and a significant number of participants believed that the famous
107. Although this method of proof is viable, judges and commentators have expressed concerns
over the ability of famous mark holders to craft questions that would elicit meaningful responses from
consumers. Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Moskin, supra note
106, at 853; MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 29:94.2).
108. Steven B. Pokotilow & Stephen A. Fefferman, FTDA Survey Evidence: Does Existing Case
Law Provide Any Guidance for Constructing a Survey?, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1150, 1155 (2001).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Surveys may also be necessary to prove that the mark is famous, as required by the FTDA.
However, the Moseley decision did not address the fame of the mark. Therefore, this Note does not
address surveys used to prove fame.
112. Id.
113. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir.
2004). The court also discussed likelihood of tamishment, but neither the Ninth Circuit nor the district
court below detailed the type of evidence used to show tamishment. Id.
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mark holder sponsored or was associated with the banner ads at issue. 114
However, the court remanded the case to re-open discovery on the issue of
dilution because the evidence would not meet the Moseley actual dilution
requirement.11 5 Although the court did not provide any reasoning to sup-
port its conclusion that this evidence would not satisfy an actual dilution
standard, this case shows that famous mark holders must use care when
crafting their surveys because survey responses tending to show confusion
will not necessarily also show dilution. Instead, these responses may only
show mere mental association between the famous mark and the junior
user's mark. The consumer survey must therefore ask questions specifically
designed to show "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services."' 116
Various survey methods have been suggested to prove trademark dilu-
tion, although case law evidencing effective consumer surveys for dilution
is relatively scarce. The United States Solicitor General filed an amicus
brief in the Moseley case advocating an actual dilution standard but not an
actual economic harm standard. 1 7 The government discussed potential
ways that Victoria's Secret could have made a showing of actual dilution
using consumer survey evidence. 118 These consumer surveys that were
suggested by the government remain a viable method of proving dilution
after Moseley.
First, the government suggested a type of consumer survey to prove
dilution by blurring. The government suggested that Victoria's Secret could
have surveyed two groups of consumers, one that was aware of Victor's
Little Secret and one that was not. Both groups would then be asked what
goods they associate with Victoria's Secret. If consumers aware of Victor's
Little Secret stated that they associated Victoria's Secret both with lingerie
and sex toys, while consumers unaware of Victor's Little Secret only asso-
ciated Victoria's Secret with lingerie, then such responses could be used to
show actual dilution by blurring. 119
114 Id. at 1026.
115. Id. at 1034.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
117. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 9.
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24.92.2; Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 329-30 (1999) (Bible calls this increased "typicality" of the famous mark.).
A commentator has also suggested that a variant of this survey was discussed by the government. When
asked the same question, if those aware of Victor's Little Secret were less likely to associate Victoria's
Secret with women's lingerie than those not aware of Victor's Little Secret, then the disparity could be
used as evidence of actual dilution by blurring. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24.94.2 (citing U.S.
Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 22-24; Bible, supra).
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The government also discussed two types of surveys that could be
used to show dilution by tarnishment. First, Victoria's Secret could have
asked consumers to give the positive and negative attributes of the Victo-
ria's Secret mark. If consumers aware of Victor's Little Secret gave more
negative attributes and fewer positive attributes than those not aware of
Victor's Little Secret, then these responses could be used as evidence of
actual dilution by tarnishment.120 Second, consumers could be asked to rate
a quality of the famous mark, such as tastefulness, on a scale of one being
tasteless and ten being tasteful. If those aware of Victor's Little Secret gave
rating closer to tasteless than those not familiar with Victor's Little Secret,
this result could be used as evidence of actual dilution. 121
These types of surveys were suggested by commentators before Mose-
ley, as well as to the Supreme Court directly in the Solicitor General's
amicus brief. Nothing in the Moseley opinion suggests that these types of
surveys are not still viable means of proving dilution under the actual dilu-
tion standard. Such survey results would show that consumers not only
made a mental association between the junior user's mark and the famous
mark, but also that the junior user's mark lessened the ability of the famous
mark to identify goods and services or that the junior user's mark nega-
tively changed consumers' perception of the famous mark.
2. Surveys Used Before Moseley that are Unlikely to Satisfy an Actual
Dilution Requirement
The Moseley decision did render certain types of consumer surveys
ineffective. Certain survey questions may elicit responses that will only
show mental association between the famous mark and the junior user's
mark. This mental association alone is not sufficient post-Moseley to prove
actual dilution.
For example, the survey used in Wawa, Inc. v. Haafl22 would likely be
unsuccessful in proving dilution post-Moseley. In Wawa, the Wawa mark
was used as the name of over 500 convenience stores, while Haaf's HAHA
mark was used as the name of one convenience store. 123 Wawa claimed
120. U-S. Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 22-23; William G. Barber, How to Do a Trademark
Dilution Survey (or Perhaps How Not to Do One), 89 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 630 (1999); Prager, supra
note 9, at 132. Such other attributes might include, among others, wholesome, family-oriented, and
good value. Prager, supra note 9, at 132.
121. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 23, Bible, supra note 119, at 328-29. Bible says this type
of survey shows how the junior use has affected the "brand equity" of the famous mark.
122. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
123. Id. at 1631.
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that HAHA caused dilution by blurring. 124 Wawa introduced survey evi-
dence that showed that 29% of persons surveyed in the neighborhood of the
HAHA convenience store associated the HAHA store with the Wawa
store. 125 The court found this evidence persuasive of dilution. After Mose-
ley, however, such survey evidence would likely not prove actual dilution.
This evidence only shows that consumers made a mental association be-
tween Wawa and HAHA, and under Moseley, such an association is insuf-
ficient to prove actual dilution, particularly when the marks are not
identical.
Additionally, the survey used in Ringling12 6 would be insufficient to
establish actual dilution post-Moseley. In Ringling, Ringling interviewed
consumers at shopping malls, including one in Utah.12 7 Consumers were
given the statement: "THE GREATEST __ ON EARTH" and asked
what words they would use to fill in the blank. 128 The consumers were also
asked with whom they associated the completed phrase. 129 In Utah, 25% of
the consumers answered "show" and associated it with the circus; 24% of
consumers answered "snow" and associated it with Utah; and 21% of con-
sumers answered both but associated "show" with the circus and "snow"
with Utah. 130 Outside of Utah, 41% of the consumers answered "show" and
associated it with the circus; 0% of consumers answered "snow" and asso-
ciated it with Utah; and less than 0.5% of consumers answered both. 131
The district court concluded that this consumer evidence did not show
that consumers even made a mental association between "Greatest Show on
Earth" and "Greatest Snow on Earth" because consumers associated the
circus only with "show" and Utah only with "snow." 132 The district court
further found that the survey failed to prove that Utah's use caused any
"lessening of the capacity of Ringling's trademark slogan to identify and
distinguish its circus as the mark's subject." 133 The court noted that more
consumers in Utah (46% total) had associated show with the circus than in
the rest of the country (41% total) and that all consumers associated the
124. Id. at 1631-32.
125. Id. at 1632.
126. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 462.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (discussing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va, 1997)).
133. Id. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Greatest Show on Earth mark with Ringling alone. 134 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court findings. 135
The main flaw in this fill-in-the-blank survey was that the survey did
not attempt to show a connection between the famous mark and the junior
user's mark. The survey only showed that people in Utah were aware of the
Utah slogan, and not that this awareness lessened the capacity of Ringling's
mark to identify its circus. To show even a mental association, the survey
should have asked Utahans if the phrase "Greatest Show on Earth" re-
minded them of any other slogans. However, under Moseley, mental asso-
ciation alone is insufficient to prove actual dilution, and Ringling should
have also used one of the approaches later suggested by the Solicitor Gen-
eral to show blurring. 136 Therefore, fill-in-the-blank surveys, such as the
one used in Ringling, are not alone sufficient to prove actual dilution.
Post-Moseley, the consumer survey remains the most powerful tool
that famous mark holders can use to prove that nonidentical junior uses
have caused actual dilution. Famous mark holders must use care in crafting
the survey so that the results will show not only that consumers made a
mental association between the famous mark and the junior user's mark,
but also that consumers tend to identify the famous mark less strongly with
the famous mark holder or that consumers tend to view the famous mark
less favorably as a result of the junior user's mark.
C. The Revival of State Law Dilution Claims: Back to Forum-Shopping?
Famous mark holders should also pursue state law dilution claims, if
available, post-Moseley. As noted by both the Supreme Court and the
Fourth Circuit, many state dilution laws expressly require only a likelihood
of dilution. 137 The legislative history of the FTDA makes clear that Con-
134. Id.
135. Id. The Ringling court noted that:
While we might have some concern with the implicit finding that this evidence does not even
show the requisite threshold "mental association" of the two marks within the consumer mar-
ket surveyed, we have no concern respecting the specific finding that the survey evidence
does not show that use of Utah's junior mark had caused any actual harm to Ringling's mark
in the form of a lessening of that mark's former capacity to identify and distinguish Ring-
ling's circus as its subject.
Id.
136. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. Courts have also stated that the Supreme
Court's decision in Moseley did not impact the tests for finding dilution under state law. See, e.g.,
Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 167 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating in dictum
that "New York state law may not require actual dilution, even after Moseley"); Pfizer, Inc. v. Y2K
Shipping & Trading, Inc., No. 00 CV 5304(SJ), 2004 WL 896952, at *8 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004)
(holding that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on its dilution claim under New York's state
dilution law). Indeed, legal trade journals have begun to recommend state law claims as the best way to
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gress did not intend to preempt existing state dilution law because "federal
trademark law presently coexists with state trademark law, and it is to be
expected that a federal dilution statute should similarly coexist with state
dilution law." 138 State law claims will be particularly attractive when the
junior use is limited to one state, as in Moseley, because the famous mark
holder will not need the nationwide injunction available under the FTDA.
Given the greater potential for success in a state action, famous mark hold-
ers should forum-shop to bring their action in a state with a dilution statute.
Famous mark holders must also be aware that the FTDA provides a
complete bar to a state law dilution action if the junior user has a valid
federal trademark registration for the mark. 139 Thus, famous mark holders
must scrutinize trademark applications to preserve their right to bring state
dilution claims. The Patent & Trademark Office can refuse to register a
mark if the mark, when used, would cause dilution and if the famous mark
holder brings an opposition action to the trademark registration. 140 These
provisions require famous mark holders to be especially vigilant in moni-
toring trademark application filings that may dilute their famous marks if
trademark owners wish to preserve their state law dilution claims. 14 1
While famous mark holders can and should once again pursue state
dilution law claims, this consequence of the Moseley decision goes directly
against Congress' intent in passing the FTDA-to bring national uniform-
ity to trademark dilution law. In fact, the legislative history of the FTDA
shows that Congress did not intend such a result because Congress specifi-
cally wanted to prevent forum-shopping. 142 Now, instead of forum-
shopping for a jurisdiction where a remedy for dilution is available, famous
pursue dilution protection. See Dyan Finguerra-DuCharme, Outside Counsel: Proving Dilution of a
Trademark After 'Moseley', N.Y L.J., June 3, 2004, at 4 ("In light of the heightened standard for a
federal claim, New York trademark practitioners should consider relying on state law to prove dilu-
tion.").
138. HR. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,1031.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (2000).
141. Famous mark holders still face an uphill battle in opposing trademark registration based only
on dilution. A claim of dilution is a ground for an inter partes proceeding of opposition or cancellation.
15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2000). However, the Trademark Board has placed a higher standard on those
opposing registration based on dilution than the standard necessary when the opposition is based on
infringement. See Toro Co. v. Torohead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 1174 (T.T.A.B. 2001) ("[U]nlike in
likelihood of confusion cases, we will not resolve doubts in favor of the party claiming dilution.").
Additionally, the Trademark Board has required that the marks be "virtually identical" for a successful
opposition based on dilution. Dream Merchant Co., KFT. v. Fremonster Theatrical, Opposition No.
91152686, 2004 WL 1427397, at *8 (T.T.A.B. June 17, 2004) (holder of the Cirque du Soleil mark
opposed the registration of the mark Cirque de Flambe).
142. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 ("Protection for famous marks should not depend on whether the
forum where suit is filed has a dilution statute. This simply encourages forum-shopping and increases
the amount of litigation.").
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mark owners will be forum-shopping for the jurisdiction where the most
favorable relief is available.
In the end, famous mark holders likely will pursue an FTDA claim
only when no state law claim is available, when the famous mark holder
wants to receive injunction that has nationwide scope, or when the junior
use is the subject of a valid federal trademark registration.
D. Additional Problems of Proof and Injury Left Unsolved After Moseley
Many serious questions remain for famous mark holders after Mose-
ley. Significantly, a famous mark holder may be unable to prove actual
dilution, even through a well-crafted consumer survey, by a small and geo-
graphically isolated junior use. Moreover, if many small junior uses occur,
then actual dilution may occur in the aggregate, but the famous mark holder
will be left without a remedy.
Additionally, while famous mark holders may be able to prove trade-
mark dilution through consumer surveys, survey results that show actual
dilution likely will be unavailable until the junior use has taken some hold
of the consumer consciousness. Requiring the famous user to wait until this
occurs could cause serious damage to the distinctiveness of the famous
mark. This result is especially troubling since the FTDA only provides for
injunctive relief if the junior use is not willful. Therefore, requiring this
type of evidence necessarily means that famous mark holders, who later
show trademark dilution by a junior use, will suffer an injury to the value
of their mark that can never be compensated. 143
To minimize these negative effects (which Congress clearly placed a
value on protecting), courts should find actual dilution where the evidence
shows that actual dilution is beginning to occur. In other words, courts
should require direct evidence showing only a minimal impact and not a
substantial impact on the distinctiveness of the famous mark. 144 Absent
such relaxed standards, famous mark holders will be largely without relief
until the distinctiveness of their marks have been significantly damaged.
Because the statute only allows for injunctive relief, under a more stringent
standard, famous mark owners will not be compensated for the damages
suffered by commercial use of their famous marks.
143. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 209, 224 (2d Cir. 1999).
144. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:94 ("The theory of dilution by blurring is that if one small
user can blur the sharp focus of the famous mark to uniquely signify one source, then another and
another small user can and will do so. Like being stung by a hundred bees, significant injury is caused
by the cumulative effect, not by just one.").
44
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in Moseley made relief for famous
trademark holders difficult under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. Fa-
mous mark holders, however, are not without options.
First, famous mark holders can argue that the Moseley opinion sug-
gests that an identical junior use supports an inference of actual dilution.
Courts have already split on this issue, but limiting Moseley to nonidentical
marks allows courts to draw reasonable inferences that further the Congres-
sional purposes that underlie the FTDA. Congress clearly intended the
FTDA to protect against identical junior uses, and identical uses are more
likely to diminish the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Second, famous
mark holders can use consumer survey evidence to show either dilution by
blurring or tarnishment post-Moseley. However, the survey must be crafted
in a way that shows an actual lessening of the capacity of the famous mark
to identify goods. Third, famous mark holders should pursue state law dilu-
tion actions where state statutes require only likelihood of dilution, if the
mark holders can establish jurisdiction and if the junior use is not the sub-
ject of a valid federal trademark registration. Finally, because only injunc-
tive relief is available under the FTDA, famous mark holders should argue
that evidence that shows that actual dilution is beginning to occur should be
sufficient to prove actual dilution. Therefore, Moseley has made relief for
trademark dilution under the FTDA more difficult, but not impossible, to
obtain.
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